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Kiobel, Bauman, and the Presumption Against the
ExtraTerritorial Application of the Alien Tort
Statute
Ross J. Corbett*
¶1

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. greatly
curtailed the sorts of claims that can be brought under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).1
Contrary to some predictions, however, it did not dictate an effective end to international
human rights litigation under the ATS2 or require that defendants of ATS lawsuits be
United States nationals.3 The Court said that the presumption against a statute’s
applicability to extraterritorial conduct governed the ATS, but it may have also suggested
that some tort claims arising under the law of nations could displace that presumption, so
long as those claims “touch and concern the territory of the United States” with
“sufficient force.”4 The possibility that some claims might displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality was important enough that Justice Kennedy emphasized it in his
concurring opinion.5 The Court did not articulate any test for determining whether a
claim’s nexus with the territory of the United States had “sufficient force,” however, and
the circuit courts have given conflicting guidance on the question.6 In the following term,
* Northwestern University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, Class of 2015; University of Toronto, Ph.D.,
2005; University of Maryland, College Park, B.A., 1999.
1 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2 Cf. Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and In State
Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9 (2013) (anticipating the end of international human rights ATS litigation
after Kiobel); Christopher Whytock et al., Foreword: After Kiobel: International Human Rights Litigation
in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013) (same). See also Roger P. Alford,
The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1763–64 (2014)
(arguing that Kiobel effectively ended international human rights litigation under the ATS, but not under
state law).
3 Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002) (arguing that
the ATS is unconstitutional if held to apply to foreign defendants).
4 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. For objections to the Court’s presumption against the ATS’s
extraterritorial applicability, see Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329
(2013); Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative
Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65 (2013); Jonathan Hafetz, Human Rights Litigation and the National
Interest: Kiobel’s Application of the Presumption Against Extra-Territoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, 28
MD. J. INT’L L. 107 (2013); David Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28
MD. J. INT’L L. 241 (2013).
5 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment).
6 Compare Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (citizenship of
defendants one factor in assessing nexus), with Baloco v. Drummond Co., No. 12-15268, 2014 WL
4699481, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2014) (fact that defendants include U.S. nationals is insufficient nexus);
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (fact that defendants are U.S.
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however, the Supreme Court placed a further restriction upon litigation against foreign
entities—human rights claims or otherwise—by clarifying general personal jurisdiction
in Daimler AG v. Bauman.7 This article suggests that, because Bauman serves to allay the
foreign policy concerns underlying Kiobel in a more surgical manner, and because the
effect of Kiobel is to leave litigation concerning overseas violations of customary
international law to the state courts, Kiobel should be read to bar less human rights
litigation than it otherwise might.
At a minimum, U.S. citizens should be liable to suit in federal court for their
actions abroad. The same argument extends to corporations that are “at home” in the
United States under Bauman and even to permanent residents, i.e., to defendants who are
not U.S. nationals but whose strongest tie in practice is to the United States. The maximal
extent of ATS jurisdiction that would be compatible with Kiobel would encompass every
defendant over which general jurisdiction could be asserted after Bauman or that could
fall within a state’s long-arm statute.

I. INTRODUCTION
¶3

¶4

The Alien Tort Statute was first enacted, with somewhat different wording, by the
First Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789. It currently reads: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”8
In time, the Statute’s potential utility regarding human rights abusers was
recognized. In 1980, the Second Circuit permitted a suit by two Paraguayan citizens
against another Paraguayan citizen for the wrongful death of a fourth Paraguayan citizen
in Paraguay resulting from torture. In that case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court held
that torture was so universally condemned that it should be held to be a violation of the
law of nations under the ATS.9 The only connection any of the parties had to the United
States was that the plaintiffs were seeking asylum and the defendant could be served
notice (he was being held at the Brooklyn Navy Yard pending deportation for overstaying
corporations is insufficient nexus); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189–90 & 190 n.24 (2d Cir.
2013) (nationality of defendants is irrelevant to ATS jurisdiction); see also Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., No.
10-56739, 2014 WL 4358453, at *12–14 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (permitting plaintiffs to amend complaint
against U.S. nationals to allege domestic conduct sufficient to satisfy touch and concern test, and thus
implicitly rejecting view that nationality alone suffices); Ben-Haim v. Neeman, 543 F. Appx. 152, 154–5
(3d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of foreign-conduct case with one U.S. corporate defendant and one
unincorporated organizational defendant with headquarters in the U.S., implicitly rejecting view that
nationality alone suffices); cf. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192–94 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citizenship of
defendant should be one means of establishing nexus); Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto.
Holdings, SE, 763 F.3d 198, 219 (2d Cir. 2014) (Leval, J., concurring) (“touch and concern” is a flexible,
multifactor test rather than a bright-line rule).
7 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2013). As originally enacted, it read, “the district courts . . . shall also have cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73. For the various revisions to the text of the ATS, see William Casto, The
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
CONN. L. REV. 467, 468 n.4 (1986).
9 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
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his tourist visa).10 Filartiga seemed to open the door to so-called foreign-cubed11 civil
prosecutions of human rights abuses—where the plaintiffs, defendants, and wrongful acts
were all foreign—and to transform evolving standards of human rights norms into
statutorily backed causes of action.12
The Supreme Court did not address this new use of the ATS until twenty-four years
later in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, in which a Mexican national claimed he had been
abducted by Mexican police to stand trial in the United States for murder at the behest of
the Drug Enforcement Agency.13 Fidelity to the statute, the Court held, meant
recognizing it as a simple grant of jurisdiction over causes of action that were already
recognized when it was passed, namely, those few violations of the law of nations that
also sounded in tort—offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and
perhaps piracy.14 Yet our understanding of law has changed from that of the First
Congress, the Court argued.15 We no longer view law as a brooding omnipresence, the
content of which can be discovered, and with the elimination of any general federal
common law that this shift in our legal theories entailed, the creation of private causes of
action now usually requires Congress to act.16 Thus, the Court concluded, the ATS could
continue to have vitality only if the civil actions cognizable under it were restricted to
those eighteenth-century offenses and whatever widely accepted contemporary norms of
international law might be comparably specific.17
In 2013, the Supreme Court again restricted the sorts of claims that could be heard
in federal court under the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.18 That case
involved the claim that the defendants had helped and encouraged Nigerian police to
attack Ogoni villagers; none of the relevant conduct took place inside the United States.19
Given the canon of construction that a congressional statute is not meant to regulate
behavior beyond the territory of the United States unless Congress has manifested its
intent that it do so,20 the Court asked whether there was sufficient reason to think that the

10

Id. at 878–79.
For the source of the phrase “foreign-cubed,” see Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts
Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1775 n.20 (2014).
12 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (“[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in
1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.2d
232, 238–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Filartiga’s evolving standards test); see also Jeffrey M. Blum &
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims
Act After Filártiga v. Peña Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 59 (1981) (evolving nature of international law has
long been recognized); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 356–62 (1997) (Filartiga initiated the paradigm of modern
human rights litigation, which now uses the ATS as the statutory ground for a cause of action, despite its
jurisdictional character).
13 542 U.S. 692, 697–99 (2004). An earlier case, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428 (1989), dealt with a civil action brought under the ATS but was decided on Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act grounds.
14 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33.
15 Id. at 721–27.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 731–38.
18 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
19 Id. at 1662–63, 1669.
20 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010).
11
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ATS was intended to have extraterritorial application—and found that there was not.21
The controversy its answer has generated stems in part from the fact that the Court’s
interpretation of the ATS turned upon policy considerations.22 Those who attack the
Court’s answer tend to think that there are strong policy reasons in support of the
extraterritorial application of the ATS such that the ATS would provide something
approaching the assertion of universal jurisdiction over human rights abuses.23 The Court,
by contrast, enumerated a number of grave difficulties that would arise if the ATS were
to have an extraterritorial application—including that it would provide something
approaching the assertion of universal jurisdiction over human rights abuses—and held
that “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”24
The Court did not hold that the Alien Tort Statute was to have no extraterritorial
applicability, at least not unequivocally.25 Parts II and III of the majority opinion argue
that there is a presumption against the extraterritorial applicability of congressional
statutes and this presumption applies to claims brought under the ATS.26 The logic of
those parts would apply to all ATS litigation,27 but in applying that logic to the particular
facts in Kiobel, finding that they did not suffice to overcome this presumption, the Court
went on to then note that any claims sufficient to displace that presumption would have to
do more than merely “touch and concern” the territory of the United States.28 The Court’s
wording here is best described as “suggestive,” insofar as it does not bare its meaning
openly. Kiobel may be read to have closed the door to all foreign-conduct ATS litigation
whatsoever, leaving the statute to authorize only suits brought by aliens for events that
transpired within the United States. But the Court may also have implied that some
conduct abroad that touches and concerns the territory of the United States might indeed
do so “with sufficient force” to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. This
would certainly be a narrow set of cases, narrower than those elaborated by Justice
Breyer in his opinion concurring in the judgment,29 but there are strong reasons of
21

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–69.
See Kaki Johnson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Alien Tort Statute’s Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 60 LOY. L. REV. 171, 198–201 (2014) (the Court’s decision reflects its foreign policy
judgments); Julian Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 835 (2013) (Kiobel signals the death of universal jurisdiction); cf. Donald
Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO
L.J. 709, 732–37 (2012) (explaining policy concerns of federal courts over ATS litigation).
23 See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1332–41 (ATS grants universal jurisdiction, and so the presumption
against extraterritoriality does not apply); Stephanie Redfield, Searching for Justice: The Use of Forum
Necessitatis, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 893, 921–23 (2014) (the Court should have considered that the ATS
provided the only forum available in many human rights cases); Louise Weinberg, What We Don't Talk
About When We Talk About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1471, 1485–91 (2014) (claiming that the Court’s foreign-policy concerns are illusory).
24 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
25 Id. at 1669; Sarah H. Cleveland, The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 8, 9–10 (2013).
26 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–69.
27 Cleveland, supra note 25, at 9–10.
28 Id.
29 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, would not invoke the presumption
against territorial applicability at all, but would instead require that one of three conditions be met before a
22
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federalism and foreign relations why we would not want this set of cases to be empty,
and the history of the ATS suggests that the First Congress shared these same concerns.
Part II of this comment examines the language of Kiobel in order to establish that it
need not be read as foreclosing all foreign-conduct human rights litigation. Part III looks
at what is likely an unintended consequence of the Kiobel decision, namely, that rather
than eliminating human rights litigation over violations committed abroad from domestic
courts, it will shift that litigation from the federal courts to the state courts. That is,
instead of buffering the United States from the dangers of being the forum for foreignconduct human rights litigation, the ultimate impact of Kiobel may be that the United
States will be embroiled in these issues by courts less amenable to control by—and less
deferential to—the political branches of the federal government. Part IV builds upon
previous research suggesting that the Alien Tort Statute was enacted precisely to take
cases away from the states that could present the potential for embarrassment to the
United States. Part V concludes, therefore, that foreign-conduct litigation should either be
heard in the federal courts or excluded from both the federal and state courts. Such
exclusion is done more effectively by policing personal jurisdiction, as the Court did in
Bauman. Therefore, Kiobel should be read to permit foreign-conduct human rights
litigation (1) when personal jurisdiction can be established on the basis of the new criteria
for general jurisdiction or (2) when the brunt of the harm was felt in and intentionally
aimed at the United States (and not other means of establishing specific jurisdiction).

II. THE MEANING OF “TOUCH AND CONCERN”
¶9

The effect of Kiobel on suits under the Alien Tort Statute for human rights
violations committed abroad is not immediately clear. The first three parts of the majority
opinion would seem categorically to forbid any such suits.30 The fourth and concluding
part, however, contains language that can be read in one of two ways. Either it limits the
scope of the holding only to those cases in which there is no domestic conduct that
contributes to human rights abuses abroad, in which case the presumption against
extraterritoriality would still hold strong, or it suggests that a different set of facts could
permit a suit for foreign-conduct human rights abuses.
¶10
The key language of the fourth part of the Court’s opinion is what it says about
claims that “touch and concern the territory of the United States”:
¶11
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And
even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do
so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. –––– (slip op. at 17–24). Corporations are often present in many
countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If
Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be
required.31
case could be brought under the ATS: (1) the alleged tort occurred on U.S. soil; (2) the defendant is a U.S.
national; or (3) an important U.S. interest was “substantially and adversely” affected by the defendant’s
conduct. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Breyer, J., concurring).
30 Cleveland, supra note 25, at 9–10.
31 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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Although the Court cited to Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the language
of “touch and concern” does not appear in that opinion.32 Nor does the phrase “touch and
concern” appear in the cases upon which Morrison relied.33
¶13
The discussion in Morrison to which the Kiobel Court cited, however, addressed
whether the presumption against extraterritorial application bars suit for a harm caused by
the combination of activity within the United States and foreign conduct.34 If the portion
of the activities that occurred on U.S. soil were the “focus” of Congress’s concern in
passing the statute (in Morrison, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act), then any suit
seeking damages for those activities would not be seeking an extraterritorial application
of the statute and so would not be barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality.35
Kiobel follows its citation to this discussion with a remark that bare corporate presence in
the United States would not be sufficient to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.36 The content of the Morrison decision cited and Kiobel’s remark about
corporate presence suggest that the “touch and concern” language deals with cases where
all the relevant conduct did not take place outside of the United States.
¶14
Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Thomas all joined the majority opinion, but their
dueling concurrences push us in opposite directions regarding what the Court meant by
“touch and concern” and whether the only question in future cases will be whether there
is sufficient domestic conduct to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.37 Both
concurrences suggested that the majority opinion left some significant questions
unanswered38 (as did the four justices who concurred only in the judgment),39 but there is
substantial daylight between them regarding what these significant, unanswered questions
are. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, would require that the conduct occurring in
the United States rise to the level of a violation of international law or treaty (rather than
just contribute to an overseas violation) before suit could be brought under the ATS.40
They suggested that this would answer what the majority left unanswered,41 thus
implying that the question the majority left unanswered involved the extent of domestic
activity that would be necessary for a suit not to involve any extraterritorial application of
the ATS—and thus that there can be no extraterritorial application of the statute
whatsoever. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, by contrast, explicitly discussed human

See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
Cf. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155
(1993); E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
34 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–88.
35 Id.
36 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
37 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669–70 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
38 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The opinion for the Court is careful to leave open
a number of significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”); Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring) (“This formulation obviously leaves much unanswered.”).
39 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (the Court “leaves for another day the
determination of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’”).
40 Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 1669–70.
32
33
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rights abuses committed abroad,42 suggesting that the majority opinion does not present
an absolute bar to foreign-conduct human rights litigation.
¶15
Had the Court intended to foreclose foreign-conduct human rights litigation, it
could have done so more clearly. The Kiobel majority opinion spoke of “claims” that
touch and concern the territory of the United States, for example.43 It did not speak of
“conduct” that touches and concerns the territory of the United States or claims that
“touch and concern conduct” within the territory of the United States, even though
Morrison speaks of conduct, as does the sentence preceding Kiobel’s “touch and
concern” remarks.44 The beginning of the “touch and concern” sentence—“And even
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States”45—cuts both ways.
It could mean that these claims are in contradistinction to the facts in Kiobel, where all
the relevant activity took place abroad, or it could merely signal that what follows is
dicta.
¶16
It should be unsurprising that different courts have come to different conclusions
about what Kiobel requires regarding foreign-conduct ATS suits. Some courts have held
that Kiobel represents an absolute bar to suits for international law violations committed
in the territory of a foreign sovereign, even if some preparatory conduct occurred in the
United States.46 The Second and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that overseas human rights
violations planned or otherwise facilitated from the United States might “touch and
concern” U.S. territory with sufficient force, but that the bare fact that defendants are
U.S. citizens does not.47 The Ninth Circuit has implicitly applied the same rule,
permitting plaintiffs to amend their complaint in order to allege actions within the United
States while silently assuming that the defendants’ incorporation in the United States did
not satisfy Kiobel.48 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, has considered the fact that the
defendants were U.S. nationals and that the locus of their contractual relations was the
United States, among other factors, in finding the presumption to have been rebutted.49 A
42

Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (majority opinion).
44 Id.; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–88 (2010).
45 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis added).
46 E.g., Jovic v. L-3 Services, Inc., No. 10-CV-5197, 2014 WL 4748614, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2014)
(some domestic conduct insufficient if focus of conduct is abroad).
47 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (Colombian citizens sued
for actions of paramilitary groups allegedly facilitated by U.S. corporations, but as there was no domestic
conduct alleged, the suit could not be brought under the ATS); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174,
189–91 (2d Cir. 2013) (South African citizens sued for actions of the apartheid government allegedly
facilitated by U.S. corporations, but were barred for lack of domestic conduct); see also Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357, 2014 WL 4746256, at *12–14 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2014); Krishanti v.
Rajaratnam, No. 09-CV-5395, 2014 WL 1669873, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014).
48 Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 10-56739, 2014 WL 4358453, at *12–14 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (former
child slaves from the Ivory Coast brought a class action against multinational companies that controlled
Ivorian cocoa production prior to the decision in Kiobel; rather than dismiss for failing to allege domestic
conduct or deciding the meaning of “touch and concern,” the court permitted plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to allege domestic conduct).
49 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (suit by Iraqi citizens
against military contractor for alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib touched and concerned the territory of the
United States, considering that: the defendant was a U.S. corporation; its employees accused of the abuses
were U.S. citizens; the relevant contractual relationships were centered in the United States; the defendant’s
manager’s might have covered up, tolerated, or given implicit (but not explicit) encouragement to the
43
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number of district courts have noted that the Court’s remarks about claims that “touch
and concern” the United States might allude to a test for whether a particular case of
foreign conduct rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality, but have held that any
such test could not be satisfied in the case before them.50 Other district courts have ruled
that purely extraterritorial acts that touched and concerned the United States could
displace the presumption against extraterritoriality and that the cases before them did
so.51
¶17
It seems fair to say, then, that the majority’s “touch and concern” language is a kind
of placeholder for future disagreement, neither requiring domestic conduct nor saying
that no domestic conduct is required. This does not leave us completely free to devise
whatever test we like for when (if ever) foreign-conduct human rights litigation may be
brought under the ATS, but it does mean that Kiobel has not rendered all discussion on
the topic moot.

III. KIOBEL’S LIKELY IMPACT: STATE COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶18

The Supreme Court in Kiobel evinced a strong concern for how human rights
litigation might affect U.S. foreign interests. It noted that there is a presumption against
the extraterritorial applicability of statutes “‘to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord.’”52 Even though the ATS did not claim to regulate behavior abroad—it simply
provides a forum for behavior forbidden by the law of nations—a reading of its
jurisdictional grant as covering foreign conduct would implicate these same foreign
policy concerns.53 Because the ATS authorizes judges to discern the contours of
international law, every case brought under it has the potential to embarrass the United
States internationally, the Court reasoned; this would be doubly true if the case “reaches
conduct within the territory of another sovereign.”54 Because the prosecution of pirates
for acts upon the high seas does not risk offending other sovereigns in this way, by
contrast, actions under the ATS for torts committed during piracy did not implicate
foreign policy concerns.55 The Court emphasized that the “fledgling Republic” was
“struggling to receive international recognition,” and so concluded that the ATS was not
intended to be an unprecedented self-nomination as the guardian of the world’s morals.56

foreign conduct complained of; and Congress may have signaled its intent that U.S. nationals not be
shielded from responsibility for the sort of conduct engaged in abroad); see also Du Daobin v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014) (U.S. defendant and some U.S. activity alleged).
50 E.g., Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 09-CV-1289, 2013 WL 2370594, at *14 (D.D.C. May
31, 2013) (victim’s siblings sued for torture and murder in Iranian jail).
51 Ahmed v. Magan, No. 10-CV-00342, 2014 WL 4479077, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) (involving
permanent resident defendant); Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, at *4–5 (D.D.C. 2013) (involving the
1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam).
52 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1665.
55 Id. at 1667.
56 Id. at 1668.
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Throwing open the doors of the courthouse to every plaintiff wronged anywhere in the
world would generate friction with foreign sovereigns.57
The policy considerations that drove the Court in Kiobel recommend against having
particular cases heard in the United States, but the only necessary result of that decision is
to exclude certain cases from federal court. A number of cases with the potential to
damage U.S. foreign relations may still be heard in the United States, just now in state
court. And the litigation of sensitive claims in state court has the potential to cut against
the policy considerations that motivated the First Congress to pass the ATS and later
spurred the Court in Kiobel to restrict its extraterritorial application.
Even before Kiobel, international human rights scholars were advocating a shift
away from the federal courts and toward state courts.58 They argued that international
human rights litigation that took place in the states would not be brought under the ATS,
so the subject matter cognizable in state courts would not be bound by the Court’s
holding in Sosa.59 The Second Circuit had ruled that corporations could not be held liable
under the ATS.60 Litigation in state courts would not be bound by this holding, either.61
Similarly, there would be no barrier to liability for acting in concert.62 Further, state
courts are not always as stringent as federal courts regarding exhaustion of remedies or
forum non conveniens—or even pleading standards.63
A shift in litigation strategy to the state court system will likely be accompanied by
the lobbying of state governments and state courts to make them more hospitable to
foreign-conduct human rights litigation.64 Some states are more receptive to this sort of
lobbying than others, and so we should not be surprised to see it succeed in some
jurisdictions.
The effect of Kiobel, then, is not a prohibition on hearing foreign-conduct human
rights cases in the United States. Rather, it is a pronouncement that the cases barred by
the presumption against extraterritoriality may be heard only in the state courts.65
A. State Jurisdiction Over the Law of Nations

¶23

The ATS authorizes suits in federal court for “tort,”66 and the states have a clear
authority to punish torts. The question is whether state courts have the authority to punish
torts committed outside their borders, assuming they can obtain personal jurisdiction over
57

Id. at 1669.
See Patrick Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 45 (2013); Childress, supra note 22, at 740; Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 2; Austen L.
Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigations: A Concerning Trend?, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
25, 25 n.1 (2013) (listing scholars).
59 See Borchers, supra note 58, at 48–49; Childress, supra note 22, at 740; Hoffman & Stephens, supra
note 2.
60 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
61 Borchers, supra note 58, at 48–49.
62 Id.
63 Childress, supra note 22, at 740.
64 See, e.g., Jeffrey Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 301 (2014) (arguing that states
should not restrict the extraterritorial applicability of their common law).
65 Cf. Casto, supra note 8, at 510 (arguing pre-Kiobel that restrictions on the ATS would drive cases into
state court).
66 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
58
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the defendant.67 A reliance on the doctrine of transitory torts will permit some suits, but
only if there is a good-faith basis for believing that the case could have been brought
under the laws of the jurisdiction where the violation occurred.68 This would cover cases
where for one reason or another the suit could not be brought in the jurisdiction where the
tort was committed, either because the defendant could not be brought to court there or
because the courts were nonfunctional. But the doctrine of transitory torts would not
cover all human rights abuses committed abroad, and probably would not cover the
abuses most in need of some forum: those that are not illegal in the place where the
activity occurs or, if illegal, occur with official disregard of the nation’s stated laws.69
The question that hence arises is whether the states could recognize causes of action for
violations of the law of nations, rather than the law of any particular legislative sovereign.
¶24
Choice-of-law principles currently serve to limit the applicability of a state’s laws
beyond its borders.70 These principles are, however, state substantive law: they represent
a choice by each state not to permit suits that do not in some way concern the state, and
the states differ in how they choose to define the limits of their legislative or prescriptive
jurisdiction.71
¶25
States do not possess an unlimited right to assert universal jurisdiction, of course,
insofar as they are bound by the requirements of due process.72 The due process concerns
that limit a state’s legislative jurisdiction, however, stem from the unfair surprise to a
defendant regarding what was and was not permissible when and where he or she acted,73
and these concerns seem out of place when what is at issue are supposedly universal
international law norms.
¶26
There has not been much occasion for the courts to treat the jurisdiction of the
states to hear cases involving the law of nations, but the rarity with which this subject has
been treated is more the result of historical accident than of any necessity. Where the
states have heard cases involving conduct beyond their borders, it usually has been under

67

For a good discussion of the extraterritorial effect of common law as distinct from state statutes, see
Jeffrey Meyer, supra note 64. The Supreme Court seems to have rejected Meyer’s contention that the
presumption against extraterritoriality is weaker when it comes to common law in Kiobel, however, since
the causes of action cognizable under the ATS form a part of federal common law.
68 Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 81, 87–92 (2013). For an argument that human rights litigation ought to embrace the shift
away from the ATS toward a theory of transitory torts, and an analysis of the choice-of-law problems that
this shift brings, see Alford, supra note 2; Roger P. Alford, Human Rights After Kiobel: Choice of Law and
the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 1089 (2014).
69 Cf. Keitner, supra note 68, at 92–93 (contrasting the doctrine of transitory torts with that of universal
jurisdiction, only the latter clearly permitting the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction where lex loci fails).
70 See Alford, supra note 2, 1761–64; Meyer, supra note 64, at 314–19.
71 See Alford, supra note 2, 1761–64; Meyer, supra note 64, at 314–19.
72 See Alford, supra note 2, 1761–64; Childress, supra note 22, at 751–52; Curtis Bradley, Universal
Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 323, 326 n.13 (2001). Bradley also notes that state
attempts to assert universal jurisdiction may be limited insofar as they are preempted by federal law or
treaty. Id. The issue of preemption is addressed infra Part III.B.
73 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822–23 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 307–13 (1981); see also Meyer, supra note 64, at 328–29 (discussing Allstate). Note that these
cases were decided in the context of choice of law and the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, in addition to due process. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is implicated, of
course, only regarding other U.S. states. See Alford, supra note 2, at 1763–64 (2014).
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the doctrine of transitory torts.74 As the Supreme Court noted in Kiobel, that doctrine
presumes that what is being tried in the United States would have also provided a cause
of action where it occurred.75 Moreover, there was less international interconnectedness
in the past to give rise to cross-border suits for human rights violations, apart from those
committed on the high seas.76 Human rights litigation (as opposed to trials for war crimes
or the passage of international agreements) is also a relatively recent phenomenon.77
¶27
What law there is on the subject, however, suggests that the states would have
jurisdiction to hear the sorts of cases that caused the Kiobel Court concern. In United
States v. Arjona, for example, the Supreme Court noted that Congress’s enumerated
power “to define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations”78 did not strip the
states of the authority to do the same thing.79 The case involved Congress’s power to
punish the counterfeiting of foreign currency, when the Constitution speaks only of “the
Securities and current Coin of the United States.”80 The Court ultimately found that
punishing the counterfeiting of foreign currency was necessary and proper to Congress’s
power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations (and, as a nation whose
currency was almost entirely paper money, the United States had an interest in promoting
the view that counterfeiting was contrary to the law of nations).81 One reason why the act
was necessary and proper was that Congress could not compel the states to outlaw the
counterfeiting of foreign currency, but the Court further noted that it was entirely within
the power of the states to enforce the law of nations by doing what Congress could not
compel them to do.82 The Constitution makes the federal government the face of the
United States abroad,83 the Court noted, but it apparently does not strip the states of all
concern for the law of nations.
¶28
The Court noted the concurrent legislative authority of the states concerning the
law of nations in dicta, and it is difficult to predict whether the Court would uphold that
ruling today, as Arjona was decided in 1887.84 The view of the states as having
obligations under the law of nations presupposes that they have a particular status among
nations that was more prevalent in the nineteenth century than it is today.85
74

Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 2, at 11; Keitner, supra note 68, at 90; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs could have brought action in state court under the doctrine of
transitory torts, as the state court had personal jurisdiction; torture was actionable in the foreign nation
where it occurred, and the policies of the state were consistent with giving force to the foreign law).
75 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013); see also R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND )
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS L AW § 19 (1965); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 12, at 63–64 (discussing
transitory torts in the context of state court adjudication of the law of nations).
76 One reason the abolition of the slave trade gave rise to cases dealing with universal jurisdiction was the
fact that the slave trade involved transport through international waters. E.g., United States v. The La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
77 Parrish, supra note 58, at 28–33; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 356–62 (Filartiga
initiated modern human rights litigation).
78 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887) (quoting U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
79 Id.
80 U.S. C ONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
81 Arjona, 120 U.S. at 486–88.
82 Id. at 487.
83 Id. at 483–84.
84 See id.
85 Compare Desebats v. Berquier, 1 Binn. 336, 347 (Pa. 1808) (Yeates, J.) (applying foreign inheritance
law as “part of lex gentium . . . founded on the mutual courtesy of independent governments,” viz. Great
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There are reasons, however, for suspecting that, in the absence of preemption, the
states are not barred from applying international law in their own courts. Prime among
these is the fact that they could have heard the cases that were actionable under the Alien
Tort Statute. As discussed at greater length below,86 the ATS was enacted because of a
worry that states might fail to hear such cases. The version of the ATS that formed a part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 explicitly said that the district courts were to have concurrent
authority with the states;87 the current version of the ATS does not provide the district
courts with exclusive jurisdiction, thereby preserving the states’ concurrent jurisdiction.88
¶30
It is possible that a state court might claim jurisdiction on the theory that the
plaintiffs are asking it to enforce federal common law, insofar as customary international
law can form a part of federal common law89 and state courts may enforce federal law
(where Congress has not given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction).90 Ordinarily,
federal common law suffices for federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.91
This does not seem to be the case, however, when the content of federal common law
comes from customary international law,92 although the position that it should does have
some advocates.93 A state court hearing such a federal common law claim would
therefore have exclusive jurisdiction. Still, a state court that heard human rights abuse
cases as a matter of federal law would certainly leave itself open to review by the
Supreme Court.94 Consequently, this theory of why the states could hear foreign-conduct
human rights litigation is not as worrisome in terms of the national interest.
¶31
There is a way in which states could hear human rights cases without Supreme
Court review, however. The state’s jurisdiction to hear a case could instead be framed as
a matter of state common law. Whether or not customary international law formed a part
of a given state’s common law would be a question of state law to be decided by the state
Britain and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) with Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939) (“The several states of the
Union are entities unknown to international law. It would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our
state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international law.”). Under the modern
view, states would have obligations to enforce international law as a matter of the Supremacy Clause, not
as independent sovereigns. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86 See infra Part IV.
87 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
88 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
89 Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“[T]he domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations.”). Aside from the odd result regarding federal question jurisdiction discussed
immediately following this note, this absorption of the law of nations by federal common law is
problematic. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
90 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 135–42 (1876).
91 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972).
92 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19 (denying that the Court’s holding would permit federal question
jurisdiction for customary international law claims under the rubric of federal common law).
93 13D C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT & ARTHUR R. M ILLER , F ED . P RAC . & P ROC. J URIS . § 3563 (3d ed.
2013) (“A good argument can be made on this same theory that a claim based upon customary international
law should be sufficient for federal question jurisdiction. When it is applied in the federal courts it owes its
authority to the United States and should be regarded as a federal law.”); Casto, supra note 8, at 471
(suggesting that federal courts have jurisdiction over cases with international law causes of action under
general federal question jurisdiction); cf. Alford, supra note 2, at 1767–70 (suggesting diversity jurisdiction
as a means of getting federal common law claims based on international law into the federal courts after
Sosa).
94 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (governing the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts).
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supreme court.95 That the law of nations did form a part of the common law was widely
acknowledged at the nation’s founding,96 and while the general legal theory that gave rise
to that judgment has since been abandoned in favor of positivism, nothing prevents a
state court, eager to present itself as the vindicator of human rights, from adopting that
judgment.97
¶32
Closing the federal courts to all foreign-conduct human rights litigation not only
raises the specter of state court adjudication of claims that implicate the national honor,
but it raises the further specter of the state courts implicating the national honor according
to fifty different—and likely contradictory—interpretations of customary international
law.98 In principle, there ought to be uniformity among the states regarding what
international law requires, just as distinct sovereigns ought to agree on what it requires.
The only procedure for enforcing such uniformity, however, would be for a case to work
its way through the state court system and then be taken up by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This would require that there be an issue of federal law, and the only way for there to be
such an issue may well be if international law were incorporated into federal common
law wholesale—a step the Supreme Court seems loath to take.
¶33
The ATS is not the only way to get into federal court, of course, and a number of
problematic cases will doubtlessly be removable on diversity jurisdiction grounds. Two
problems attend this solution, however. First, not all of the cases will be removable to
federal court. A single alien co-defendant would destroy complete diversity, for
95

Cf. Jessup, supra note 85, at 742–43 (Erie should not apply to international law, lest state courts have an
unreviewable power to pass on the content of customary international law).
96 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 113, 119 (1784)); The Maria, 165 Eng. Rep. 955, 958 (Adm. 1807); 1 W ILLIAM B LACKSTONE ,
COMMENTARIES *263–67; Edwin Dickenson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101 U. P A. L. REV. 26, 27 (1952). See also Brown v. Union Ins. Co. at New-London, 4 Day
179, 186 (Conn. 1810) (Connecticut adopts law of nations into its common law); Desebats v. Berquier, 1
Binn. 336, 345 (Pa. 1808) (Tilghman, C.J.) (law of nations incorporated into common law); Pearsall v.
Dwight, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 84, 89 (Mass. 1806) (law of nations a part of the common law); Casto, supra
note 8, at 489 (law of nations considered part of British common law in eighteenth century); Kenneth C.
Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & P OL. 1, 11 (1985)
(same).
97 Cf. Childress, supra note 22, at 750–51 (whether the presumption against extraterritoriality can be
applied to state law is an open question). But see Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 69–
70 (1st Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (phrasing
established prohibition on state regulation of extraterritorial commercial conduct in terms of a prohibition
on state regulation of extraterritorial conduct simpliciter). Because the argument in Natsios was based on
the Commerce Clause, 181 F.3d at 69–70, and because the Supreme Court upheld that ruling on conflict
preemption rather than Commerce Clause grounds, see Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–86, it is unclear both (a)
whether the statement that “Massachusetts may not regulate conduct wholly beyond its borders” applies
also to noncommercial conduct, 181 F.3d at 69, and (b) whether such an expansive reading of the First
Circuit’s pronouncement would be good law.
98 Cf. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“[T]he foreign relations implications of [forum non conveniens] and other
issues the district court will be required to adjudicate on remand underscores the wisdom of the First
Congress in vesting jurisdiction over such claims in the federal district courts through the Alien Tort
Statute. Questions of this nature are fraught with implications for the nation as a whole, and therefore
should not be left to the potentially varying adjudications of the courts of the fifty states.”); Jessup, supra
note 85, at 743 (“The several states of the Union are entities unknown to international law. It would be as
unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of
international law.”).
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example.99 Similarly, a refugee granted permanent residency could not sue a U.S.
national from the same state in which he or she resided under diversity jurisdiction.100
Resident aliens, moreover, are considered residents of the state in which they reside for
the purposes of defeating diversity jurisdiction,101 but Article III does not extend the
federal judicial power to suits between two aliens.102 While the requirement for complete
diversity is statutory,103 the bar on diversity suits between aliens that do not involve at
least one citizen of a state is constitutional in origin.104 Consequently, an alien could not
sue a temporary or permanent resident for human rights abuses committed either abroad
or within the United States under diversity jurisdiction, even though the potential
defendants’ domicile in the U.S. would effectively shield them from suit elsewhere in the
world. 105 Foreign-cubed cases certainly could not be removed to federal court. And
foreign plaintiffs could lock U.S. defendants into state court simply by bringing suit in
the defendant’s home state.106 Second, even those cases that are removable on diversity
grounds will be judged by state law, and hence by state interpretations of international
law.107
¶34
I do not mean to suggest that state-court jurisdiction in these matters is
uncontestable. It is clear, however, that a good deal of litigation would be required for the
federal judiciary to exclude the states from this realm. It is also clear that excluding the
states from this realm would require that the Supreme Court adopt some doctrines that it
would probably be disinclined to adopt otherwise.108 It is not clear that the states actually
99

See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985); Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan
Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975).
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
101 Id.
102 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 451–52 (2011).
103 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
104 Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136 (1829); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303
(1809); Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 12, at 53.
105 Cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671, 1674–75 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment) (expressing concern that narrow reading of ATS would violate international law
obligations not to provide safe harbor to human rights abusers).
106 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); Childress, supra note 22, at 741. Childress suggests that defendants in the
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits may be able to remove based on federal question jurisdiction, given
rulings that state causes of action with substantial foreign policy interests implicate federal common law.
Id. at 741–45 (citing Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1376–78 (11th Cir. 1998); Torres v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542–43 (5th Cir. 1997); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806
F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986)); contrast with Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 803–5 (9th Cir.
2001) (federal question jurisdiction does not extend to any case implicated by the federal common law of
foreign relations; to do otherwise would negate the well-pleaded complaint rule). These cases are special in
that they involved suits brought by a foreign government or that threatened the entire economy of a foreign
government, however, and the substantial policy interests test they articulate is unlikely to enable ordinary
defendants to remove based on federal question jurisdiction.
107 Cf. Bellia & Clark, supra note 102, at 545 (Erie requires diversity suits to be judged by state law).
108 Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729–30 (2004) (refusing to overrule two centuries of
precedent to declare that the law of nations does not form a part of the domestic law of the United States);
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19 (2004) (refusing to permit federal question jurisdiction for customary
international law claims under the rubric of federal common law). See also infra notes 124–26 and
accompanying text, discussing the Supreme Court’s hesitance to invoke field preemption regarding any
state action with more than an incidental impact on foreign affairs.
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would be excluded from this realm, and it is not clear that they could be, except by
preemption.
B. Federal Issue Preemption and the Law of Nations
¶35

Accompanying the difficulty of eliminating state legislative jurisdiction over
extraterritorial conduct is a corresponding difficulty in saying that federal law has
preempted the exercise of that jurisdiction. State law may be preempted (1) because a
federal statute expressly says so; (2) because state law conflicts with a federal statute in
such a way that either it is impossible to obey both or it interferes with realizing the goals
of the federal statute; or (3) because the scope of the federal law manifests a
congressional intent to “occupy the field” and leaves no room for parallel or augmented
state regulations, or the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system itself is
assumed to preclude state law on the same subject.109 There certainly is no express
preemption regarding the law of nations. Unless a state sought to penalize behavior that
was commanded by federal law—which would be bizarre, but perhaps not unthinkable—
there could be no conflict preemption. Nor does field preemption suffice to prevent the
states from hearing foreign-cubed human rights litigation.
¶36
First, the Alien Tort Statute does not support much of an argument for preemption
where preemption would matter most, viz. where the ATS does not provide litigants
access to the federal courts. The statute is jurisdictional rather than substantive, and so it
hardly conveys a decision by Congress to so occupy the field as to deprive the states of
any role in enforcing the law of nations. It is true that the statute was later interpreted to
have a substantive component, but that substantive component was seen as an invitation
to the creation of federal common law rather than as positive legislation.110 Federal
common law does preempt state law,111 of course, but in cases where the substantive
aspect of the ATS could be said to have that preemptive effect, the statute would
necessarily function as a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts.112 The states would not
be preempted substantively regarding any act that could not be heard in federal court.
That is, the effect of limiting what can be heard in federal court under the ATS is to
simultaneously limit the preemptive effect of the ATS on state substantive law.

109

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500–01 (2012).
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728–31.
111 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424–27 (1964) (federal courts may craft common
law where foreign affairs are concerned and federal supremacy over foreign affairs would be threatened if
this common law did not preempt state rules of decision). This case has some strong language against
leaving the states free to craft their own rules of decision in cases touching foreign affairs, but that language
is tied to the question of preemption and does not control where—as is the case here ex hypothesi—federal
law does not supply the rule of decision.
112 Cf. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986) (because importance of the
federal interest either preempts state law outright or creates a federal ingredient in state-law cause of action,
federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case under general federal question jurisdiction even without the
ATS); Childress, supra note 22, at 749 (state-court human rights litigation might be preempted if the claim
effectively duplicates the ATS).
110
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Nor can state-determined rules regarding international human rights be preempted
on the argument that the law of nations forms a part of the laws of the United States.113
The Supreme Court has occasionally held that federal law embraces international law,114
but the most famous instances of this were decided prior to Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins and its rejection of any federal general common law that might justify that
embrace.115 Even if federal law embraced international law, moreover, federal law does
not preempt state law simply because the two may be parallel: there must be some
expression or implication of Congress’s intent to preempt state law,116 and that would still
be absent in this case. The fact that claims arising under international law do not suffice
for federal question jurisdiction also cuts against this understanding of the content of
federal law.117
¶38
Congress’s failure to provide a cause of action for certain human rights abuses is
also probably not enough to trigger preemption. Admittedly, preemption can be triggered
where Congress has given some indication that it does not wish to prohibit a certain kind
of activity: when Congress decided not to regulate a particular labor-relations related

113

Those who say that federal common law must encompass the law of nations so as to give the latter
preemptive effect, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824, 1825 (1998), argue backwards. Preemptive effect is the conclusion to be proven.
114 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724 (“[T]he domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of
nations.”); cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 12 (characterizing the wholesale importation of customary
international law into federal common law as unconstitutional); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815, 816–21 (1997) (noting that enough lower federal courts and academics have ascribed to the
importation of customary international law into federal common law that it deserves to be called the
“modern position”); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 28–48 (1995) (criticizing Filartiga’s suggestion that customary international law could form
part of federal common law).
115 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 114, at 849–59 (arguing that Erie makes it impossible to treat
customary international law as federal common law); Weisburd, supra note 114, at 41–44 (same); cf.
Jessup, supra note 85, 742–43 (sounding the alarm on Erie’s effect on international law). See, e.g., The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895)
(“International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense—including not only questions of right
between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions
arising under what is usually called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the
rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done
within the dominions of another nation—is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly
submitted to their determination.”); cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no
federal general common law.”).
116 Cf. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256 (2013) (presumption is against
preemption, and interference with the police powers of the state generally requires a clear and manifest
congressional purpose to do so). Where Congress has manifested that intent to occupy the field, however,
even parallel or complementary state statutes are preempted. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2502 (2012).
117 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 n.19 (denying that the Court’s holding would permit federal question
jurisdiction for customary international law claims under the rubric of federal common law).
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activity, for example, the states could not regulate that activity.118 The same principle
extends to law touching foreign relations. When Congress gave the president the
authority to impose—and suspend—sanctions against Burma, for example,
Massachusetts could not then impose its own nondiscretionary sanctions.119 The problem
comes in determining that Congress has affirmatively decided not to regulate a given
activity. Congressional failures to act do not themselves trigger field preemption; rather,
there must be a decision to act in a consciously limited way.120 If the United States
refused to ratify or join a treaty, for example, or ratified it with reservations, this might be
a good indication that the states could not enforce compliance with that treaty. In
practice, however, few laws are likely to be preempted on these grounds for the simple
reason that Congress does not ordinarily declare that it supports what are generally
regarded as human rights.
¶39
Clearly, state policies that directly touch upon the powers of war and peace can be
struck down as touching upon a national interest so vital that preemption of state law is
presumed to be a part of the federal system itself. The Supreme Court held that
California’s attempt to punish insurance companies that cooperated with the Nazis in
confiscating policies held by Jews, if only by forcing the insurance companies to disclose
certain information about their prior cooperation, intruded upon the president’s control of
national foreign policy.121 Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit for the same reason
invalidated a California law permitting American prisoners of war to sue Japanese
corporations for forced labor during World War II.122 It did the same to an attempt to
permit reparations for the Armenian Genocide.123
¶40
These cases do not stand for the proposition that field preemption excludes the
states from any act “with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs,” even when
legislating on traditional areas of state concern.124 In these cases, the state either flouted a
definite statement of U.S. foreign policy125 or formulated its own foreign policy with
regard to a specific issue instead of exercising its traditional police power in a manner
that incidentally impacted foreign affairs.126

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n,
427 U.S. 132, 148–51 (1976) (congressional refusal to deem refusals to work overtime an unfair labor
practice preempted states from deeming that refusal an unfair labor practice).
119 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–74 (2000).
120 Cf. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. at 2256 (2013) (requirement for congressional intent for
preemption to be triggered); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148–51 (congressional decision not to
include refusals to work overtime in list of unfair labor practices triggered preemption).
121 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
122 Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 711–14 (9th Cir. 2003).
123 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012).
124 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418–20 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1968)) (no need
to decide between Zschernig majority’s field preemption analysis and Justice Harlan’s conflict preemption
analysis); Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and
Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 772–76 (2007) (Crosby and Garamendi signal shift away from dormant
commerce clause and dormant foreign affairs power analysis in favor of conflict preemption); cf. Deutsch,
324 F.3d at 712–14 (finding direct conflict with U.S. foreign policy in invalidating California statute under
dormant foreign affairs analysis).
125 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401–12; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–70 (2000);
Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712–14.
126 Movsesian, 670 F.3d at 1071–72.
118
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¶41

The Court has excluded some disputes between foreign parties from American
courts even when those disputes touched upon matters of traditional state concern, but it
has done so by restricting personal jurisdiction, not by expanding the doctrine of field
preemption.127 The fact that the Court has taken one route does not bar it from adopting
the other, of course, excluding the states from governing torts that also make one hostis
humani generis,128 but it does suggest the novelty of suggesting that preemption bars such
suits.
¶42
Torts are a traditional part of a state’s bailiwick, and state incorporations of the law
of nations into their common law have not traditionally been opposed.129 Because the
states have a strong claim to render their interpretations of the law of nations binding as a
matter of state law,130 the claim that they are subject to field preemption is weak.
¶43
In the end, the states are relatively free regarding the law of nations. While
Congress no doubt could ban the states from exercising any legislative jurisdiction over
conduct that occurs outside of the United States, it has not done so. Similarly, although it
would not be frivolous to argue that Congress has already implicitly preempted the states’
legislative jurisdiction that touches upon foreign affairs or that the structure of the
Constitution itself must exclude them from the field, those arguments are not strong, and
they would require that the Court break new ground.131 It is one thing to say that federal
law provides the rule of decision in cases implicating foreign affairs; it is quite another to
say that state law is preempted even where federal law provides no rule of decision. As
the law now stands, states are not excluded from the field either as a matter of their
competency to legislate or by federal preemption. The holding in Kiobel brings back a
state of affairs that the ATS was passed in order to combat: state determination of suits
that touched upon the national honor.

IV. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND FEDERALISM
¶44

The motivating force behind the Alien Tort Statute was the danger posed by state
court adjudication of claims touching the law of nations.132 While the ATS is
unmistakably jurisdictional in nature, speaking of the jurisdiction of the district courts
and appearing amidst other jurisdictional statutes,133 it does not specify the kind of
jurisdiction it was intended to convey. While we might today understand it as an exercise
of Congress’s power to grant jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority134—and we may have to
127

See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
That is, an enemy of all humanity.
129 See cases incorporating international law into state common law, supra note 97.
130 See supra Part III.A.
131 Cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418–20 (2003) (refusing to decide between Zschernig
majority’s field preemption analysis and Justice Harlan’s conflict preemption analysis); Garamendi, 539
U.S. at 439–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (absent actual conflict with a formal expression of U.S. policy,
state law should stand).
132 See Casto, supra note 8; cf. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 830, 871–82 (2006) (arguing that the ATS was only about safe-conduct, and thus only
about torts committed where the U.S. exercised some protective power over the plaintiff).
133 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1369.
134 Cf. U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2.
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in order to sustain its constitutionality—its primary purpose was to ensure a fair forum in
which certain kinds of disputes could be heard.135 It therefore secured more than simply a
forum, but a specifically federal forum. On the other side of the coin, the ATS differed
from straightforward diversity and alienage jurisdiction in that its motivation was not
simply fairness to litigants.136 The ATS is instead akin to the party-based grants of
jurisdiction concerning states and ambassadors in that unfairness to one litigant or
another could have broader political repercussions.137 The origins of the ATS do not
make it a straightforward human rights statute, however useful it may be to human rights
litigation, but neither was its intended scope so restricted as to encompass only formal
guarantees of safe conduct.138 Rather, it was and remains a mechanism for asserting
federal control over litigation that would have an impact on the national interest.
A. Alien Plaintiffs’ Access to the Federal Courts
¶45

From the text of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it is clear that the ATS was not thought
of as an exercise of Congress’s power to grant jurisdiction over federal questions. The
Judiciary Act speaks explicitly of jurisdiction concurrent with the states,139 but not in
order to make states the enforcers of federal law. The Supremacy Clause suffices for
that,140 and when it comes to federal questions the Judiciary Act either gives the federal
district courts exclusive jurisdiction141 or subjects the state courts to federal appellate
review.142 That is to say, the federal district courts were not given federal question
jurisdiction concurrent with the states, federal questions instead being channeled into one
system or the other regardless of the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
¶46
Rather, where the Judiciary Act granted federal courts jurisdiction concurrent with
the courts of the several states, it did so only in cases that could be heard in the states
already. Federal diversity jurisdiction in suits at common law or equity was concurrent
with the states, for example.143 Federal jurisdiction in suits at common law brought by the
United States (for more than $100) was also concurrent with the states.144 Similarly,
federal jurisdiction for suits brought by an alien for tort in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States was concurrent with the states.145

135

See Bellia & Clark, supra note 102, at 471–77; (discussing original intent of the ATS); Casto, supra
note 8 (same); Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 649,
652–63 (2002) (same); see also infra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of the
ATS).
136 Cf. Collins, supra note 135, at 662–63 (discussing the ATS and diversity jurisdiction).
137 Id.
138 Contrast with Lee, supra note 132.
139 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76–79.
140 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 135–42 (1876) (state courts can hear
cases involving rights arising under federal law, absent exclusive federal jurisdiction); see also Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–94 (1947) (state courts may not refuse to enforce federal law).
141 See Ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. at 76–79 (exclusive jurisdiction over federal crimes and offenses, admiralty
and maritime cases, seizures under the laws of the United States, and suits against consuls and vice-consuls
(other than those brought under the ATS or by the United States)).
142 Ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85–87.
143 Ch. 20, §§ 11, 12, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
144 Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
145 Id.
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¶47

Further light is shed on the purpose of the Alien Tort Statute by the fact that it
granted jurisdiction to the district courts, not the circuit courts. Run-of-the-mill diversity
suits, where local favoritism might affect either plaintiffs or defendants depending on the
circumstances, were heard in the circuit courts.146 Where the federal district courts had
jurisdiction, by contrast, it was the status of the plaintiff that generated access to the
federal courts.147 The purpose of the ATS, like that of federal jurisdiction over suits
brought by the United States, was to ensure that the plaintiff in particular had access to a
fair forum.
¶48
The ATS was not simply about fairness to litigants, however. It was also about
cases where unfairness to a litigant might have foreign-policy repercussions. Where
foreign-affairs concerns did not arise, the Judiciary Act provided for diversity jurisdiction
based on simple alienage and did not specify a particular cause of action necessary to
take advantage of it.148 All cases at common law for damages exceeding $500 (exclusive
of costs) to which an alien was a party could be brought in circuit court,149 and any such
case brought in state court against an alien could be removed to circuit court.150 Because
the law of nations was considered part of the common law,151 and because suits for
violations of a treaty would also be heard at law, the ATS was not needed to operate in
parallel to the Judiciary Act’s general diversity jurisdiction provisions. Any suit by an
alien for a tort in violation of the law of nations in excess of $500 could be brought in
circuit court as easily as a suit for breach of contract. Rather, the ATS enabled aliens with
certain kinds of complaints to evade the $500 jurisdictional threshold to have their cases
heard in federal court.152 The view that the ATS was intended as an exception to the $500
minimum is borne out by the fact that aliens suing under the ATS were expected to bring
their suit in district court, not circuit court.153 If an alien had a particular type of
complaint, no matter how monetarily insignificant it might have been, that alien would
never have to rely upon the state court systems for satisfaction.
¶49
Subsequent developments in the law do not rebut the view that the ATS is a quasidiversity statute. The current version of the alienage diversity statute differs from the
Judiciary Act of 1789 by specifying that one of the litigants must be a citizen of a state,
thus excluding the alien v. alien suits that could be heard in circuit court under the 1789
Act.154 It also raises the jurisdictional threshold to $75,000 and treats permanent residents
as citizens of the state in which they reside for diversity jurisdiction purposes.155
Nonetheless, the relationship between current alienage diversity and the ATS remains
unchanged: an alien alleging a tort in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States does not have to allege $75,000 in damages to make it into federal court.156
146

See Ch. 20, §§ 11, 12, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
See Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 77.
148 See Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
149 Id.
150 Ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. at 79.
151 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
152 See Casto, supra note 8, at 497–98, 500–01; Randall, supra note 96, at 16–17.
153 The district courts were decidedly inferior, the circuit courts being “envisioned as the major federal trial
courts.” Casto, supra note 8, at 496.
154 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
155 Id.
156 See id. § 1350.
147
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While alienage diversity was amended to require that one party be a citizen of a state,
aliens suing under the ATS may still bring suit in federal court against other aliens,
including permanent residents, subject only to the limitations of personal jurisdiction.157
¶50
An argument might be made that Congress’s failure to amend the ATS to require
that the defendant be a citizen of a state, as it did with alienage diversity jurisdiction, was
a simple oversight. The persuasiveness of this argument depends, however, upon a sense
that Congress would have wanted to amend the statute in this way, had they been aware
of the issue, and this is ultimately a judgment that Congress ought to have amended it.
Because of the problems attending state adjudication of these claims, it certainly is not
clear that Congress ought to have wanted to restrict the ATS in this way.
¶51
Moreover, there are constitutional reasons for the changes made to the alienage
diversity statute that do not necessarily apply to the Alien Tort Statute. Congress may
grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases “between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”158 The Judiciary Act of 1789, in granting
jurisdiction over suits between two aliens, exceeded this party-based enumeration of the
federal judicial power.159 But the ATS need not be read as an exercise of the
Constitution’s party-based jurisdiction, and so it is not hindered by the absence of alien v.
alien jurisdiction in Article III. Insofar as the law of nations can form a part of federal
law, the jurisdiction granted under the ATS ought to be read as “arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their
Authority . . . .”160 The First Congress may have intended the ATS to function like the
party-based jurisdictions of the federal courts, but its constitutional authority to achieve
this goal must instead lie in its power to grant federal courts the authority to hear federal
questions.
B. Federal Control Over Litigation Impacting the National Interest
¶52

Both the experiences of the Founding generation and subsequent history have borne
out the First Congress’s concern over state adjudication of suits with foreign policy
implications. While the states certainly have a strong interest in maintaining the
reputation of the United States abroad, a common interest does not ensure a common
policy. Indeed, common goals frequently lead to counterproductive disagreements about

157

See id.; on personal jurisdiction and extraterritoriality, see Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction
Stops Here: Cabining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705 (2014).
158 U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2.
159 Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78 (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance . . . of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where . . . an alien is a party . . . .”).
160 U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2; see Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 12, at 98–102; Randall, supra note 96, at
17–18. These authors present the ATS as simply intended as an exercise of federal question jurisdiction,
which is unlikely as a historical matter. The statute can be saved, however, by reading it in this way. Cf.
Bellia & Clark, supra note 102, at 525–28 (arguing instead for a narrow reading of the ATS to conform
with Art. III party-based grants of jurisdiction); Bradley, supra note 3 (same). Of course, if the Court
should not have affirmed in Sosa that the law of nations forms a part of federal common law in light of the
post-Erie abandonment of general federal common law, see supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text,
then the ATS must be a party-based grant of jurisdiction, thus necessitating that the defendant be a U.S.
national. As one of the arguments of this paper is that a U.S. defendant should suffice for jurisdiction under
the ATS, this possibility will not be explored in full.
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the best way to pursue those goals. Pursuit of a common goal usually requires some
deference to the entity charged with choosing the means.
¶53
During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress asked that the states adopt
various measures to punish violations of the law of nations, since foreign governments
certainly wanted assurances that the new republic would abide by international norms—
the states responded by doing nothing.161 Consequently, when a French ne’er-do-well
attacked the secretary of the French legation in Philadelphia three years later, and then
(after having posted bail) threatened him with assassination if the prosecution was not
dropped, the nation was quite worried that Pennsylvania law would not provide adequate
redress.162 Pennsylvania ultimately ruled that the law of nations formed a part of its own
municipal law (and thus that the defendant’s punishment would not be determined solely
by the damage actually inflicted),163 averting the crisis. Some years later, another
violation of the rules protecting ambassadors occurred, leading again to the same worry
that only the common law as interpreted by a particular state’s courts could be relied
upon for redress—and leading again to the same relief when the state (in this case, New
York) incorporated the law of nations into its common law.164 It was up to the states to
provide a remedy for violations of the law of nations, however, and not all of them did.165
¶54
Recent scholarship has downplayed the importance of these assaults on
ambassadors, but in order to show that the First Congress’s concern was with the less
sensational problem of violence against foreign nationals who lacked diplomatic
protection.166 International law at the time required that offenses by one state’s nationals
against those of another be punished by the offender’s government.167 The states were
less than reliable in this, especially where British subjects and their property were
concerned.168 At the same time, thwarting British creditors and abusing loyalists were
prohibited by the Treaty of Paris—both were rampant.169 Consequently, the ATS permits
suits for torts in violation of a treaty of the United States, as well.170 Of course, it was
open to the First Congress to criminalize such actions rather than have them form the
basis of a civil suit, but that approach to violations of international law was in decline and
sat uncomfortably with the federal structure of the Constitution, at least where foreign
ambassadors were not concerned.171
¶55
An argument could be made that these events suggest that the ATS was not
originally intended to extend to all suits having an impact upon the national interest, but
161

Casto, supra note 8, at 490–91.
Id.
163 Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 114 (1784).
164 Casto, supra note 8, at 494.
165 Id. at 493–94.
166 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 102; Lee, supra note 132.
167 Bellia & Clark, supra note 102, at 471–77; Lee, supra note 132, at 871–82.
168 Bellia & Clark, supra note 102, at 501–03.
169 Id. at 498–503.
170 Id. at 515.
171 Lee, supra note 132, at 886–89 (arguing that the First Congress criminalized only violations of safe
conduct granted to foreign ambassadors and other public officials, and even if it did criminalize all safeconduct violations, prosecution outside of the District of Columbia would have been so uncertain that the
ATS was needed to provide visiting merchants with redress). Lee’s argument that the 1790 Crimes Act did
not cover private persons seems strained: the clauses concerning safe conducts and violations of the law of
nations would be redundant on his reading. See Crimes Act of 1790, Sess. II, ch. IX, § 28, 1 Stat. 112.
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rather only to violations of safe conduct narrowly conceived.172 A sovereign was held
accountable for violations of safe conduct because it controlled the territory in which
those violations occurred, not because someone nominally owing that sovereign
allegiance committed them anywhere in the world.173 Extraterritorial violations of safe
conduct were possible, but were generally restricted to actions taken by the sovereign’s
military.174 By contrast, bringing the actions of private citizens within the ambit of the
ATS required a more expansive understanding of safe-conduct violations than that which
motivated the First Congress; that more expansive understanding not only hinged on
specific treaty obligations (rather than simply on the law of nations), but it also still
covered only a somewhat military kind of private activity, namely, privateering on behalf
of a foreign belligerent.175 The conclusion to be drawn from this history, it could be
argued, is that the ATS was intended to cover “torts implicating a U.S. sovereign
obligation,”176 not simply torts that implicated the national honor or could be a major
source of friction with foreign powers.
There is a difference between saying that the Alien Tort Statute was intended to
cover violations of safe conduct, however, and saying that it was meant to cover only that
kind of violation. It is telling that the language of the ATS does not restrict its
jurisdictional grant to violations of safe conduct, while the First Congress was perfectly
capable of restricting the operation of a statute to safe-conduct violations when it wanted
to do so. The Crimes Act of 1790, for example, provided punishment for anyone who:
shall violate any safe-conduct or passport duly obtained and issued under the authority of
the United States, or shall assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any other manner infract
the law of nations, by offering violence to the person of an ambassador or other public
minister.177
Ambassadors who had not yet obtained or could not produce a document of safeconduct were protected only from violence.178 Anyone with an express guarantee of safe
conduct was protected from all violations of the law of nations.179 The ATS, by contrast,
does not restrict its operation to violations of express or implied safe-conducts, instead
covering all tortious violations of international law.180
Subsequent events have demonstrated that the national interest can be substantially
affected by state-level litigation that does not involve the violation of formal safeconducts or diplomatic privileges. While the plan of the federal convention was to leave
foreign affairs to the national government,181 the states were not stripped of all the powers

172

See Lee, supra note 132, at 871–95; cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004)
(recognizing an intention to cover assaults on ambassadors and piracy, as well as violations of safe
conduct).
173 See Lee, supra note 132, at 871–82.
174 Id. at 889.
175 Cf. id. at 889–95 (explaining expansion of what could be considered a violation of safe conduct in the
eighteenth century).
176 Id. at 895.
177 Crimes Act of 1790, Sess. II, ch. IX, § 28, 1 Stat. 112.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
181 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“If we are to be one
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”).
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that would be necessary to effectuate that plan.182 Nor have politicians at the state and
local level been content to leave foreign affairs to the federal government. There was a
host of state and local sanctions directed against the apartheid regime in South Africa, for
example, or British activities in Northern Ireland.183 Massachusetts imposed its own
sanctions on Burma when Congress permitted the president to impose and lift sanctions
as he thought most efficacious.184 California sought to decide the terms on which World
War II ought to have ended a half century later, enabling reparations for art seized from
Jews185 and for forced labor at the hands of the Japanese.186 It also sought to enable
reparations for the Armenian genocide.187 These are only a few examples.
¶60
It is not the case, moreover, that a state’s lack of deference to the foreign policy
decisions of the national government is always reversible. After the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) ruled that fifty-one Mexican nationals were entitled to review and
reconsideration of their state-court convictions and sentences because they had been tried
and sentenced in violation of the Vienna Protocol on Consular Relations,188 President
George W. Bush said that the United States would discharge its duties under international
law by having state courts give effect to the ICJ’s decision.189 Texas, however, refused to
review or reconsider those convictions, citing its own code of criminal procedure.190
Because the Vienna Protocol required congressional enactment in order to be binding on
the states and because the President’s memorandum was not law, the Supreme Court held
that it was powerless to force Texas to comply with the United States’ treaty
obligations.191 Now, we could imagine actions that Congress and the president could take
to compel a state to respect the national government’s authority in foreign relations. What
this incident makes clear, however, is that the states can (and will) show a lack of concern
with the foreign-policy implications of their state court activities, especially if they
disagree with the foreign policy pursued.
¶61
Ordinarily, litigants are at the mercy of the state in which their case is heard when it
comes to the fairness of the law and of the tribunal.192 The purpose of the Alien Tort
182

See Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 723, 724–31 (2013) (noting continuing disagreement concerning relationship of federalism to foreign
affairs); cf. Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of
Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 342 (1999) (arguing that it was not contrary to
original intent of Constitution to leave states with the power to interfere in foreign affairs).
183 See Howard Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs, 13 N W. J. I NT ’ L L. & B US . 563,
564–65 (1993).
184 Massachusetts Act Regulating Contracts With Companies Doing Business With Burma, 1996 Mass
Acts 239, ch. 130, held preempted by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
185 C AL. C IV . P ROC . C ODE § 354.3 (West 2000) held preempted by Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum
of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
186 C AL. C IV . P ROC . C ODE § 354.6 (West 2000), held preempted by Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 U.S. 692
(9th Cir. 2003).
187 C AL. C IV . P ROC . C ODE § 354.4 (West 2000), held preempted by Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung
AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).
188 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nat’ls (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
189 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498 (2008).
190 Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
191 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–32.
192 See Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal
Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1800–3 (1992)
(justifying diversity jurisdiction).
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Statute was not to declare to the world that the United States would become a crusading
enforcer of international law, but rather to ensure that a particular kind of litigant would
not have to rely upon the state courts for a fair hearing.
C. Addressing Kiobel’s Impact in Light of Bauman
¶62

There were problems with human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute that
the Court could not ignore in rendering its decision in Kiobel. As soon as the law of
nations was severed from its traditional moorings and transformed into customary
international law, the ATS ceased to be a grant of jurisdiction over well-settled
substantive law and became an invitation for judges to declare what was and was not
permissible around the world.193 Decisions of a sort entrusted by the Constitution to
assemblies governed by majority vote could now be made, at least in the first instance, by
individuals.194 This was certainly not the intention behind the ATS,195 and so the Court
moved to rein in the district courts.196 Sosa struck at their ability to declare new violations
of international law,197 but some courts nonetheless discovered previously unknown
violations of the law of nations.198 Doing business with a pariah regime subjected some
corporations to suits for “aiding and abetting” in human rights abuses, a charge that
sometimes could be escaped only on summary judgment.199 There has been a constant
push to recognize environmental damage as actionable under the ATS.200 In Kiobel, the
193

Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721–27 (2004) (describing how shifts in legal theory
affected impact of the ATS).
194 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 464–
69 (2001).
195 See supra Part IV.
196 Cf. Weinberg, supra note 23, at 1478–85 (suggesting that the Court’s motivation in Sosa and Kiobel was
to thwart human rights litigation).
197 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“[T]he door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping”).
198 E.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1026–28 (C.D. Cal. 2009) aff’d in part, rev’d in
part and remanded, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013)
and aff’d, 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (racial discrimination); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112,
1154–57 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (assassination of political opposition figure); see also Sexual Minorities Uganda
v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315–19 (D. Mass. 2013) (post-Kiobel case finding persecution of LBGTI
community to satisfy Sosa standard).
199 E.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 263–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying motion
to dismiss by automobile manufacturers, noting that selling military vehicles with awareness of their
intended use to the apartheid South African regime constitutes aiding and abetting human rights violation,
but dismissing claims against bank that loaned the regime money, computer manufacturer, and arms
supplier); see also Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of suit
filed in 2010 against oil company and bank that paid illegal surcharge levied by Iraq on oil sold under the
Oil-for-Food program for “aiding and abetting” Saddam Hussein’s human rights violations); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 260–64 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary
judgment for oil company after eight years of litigation in suit claiming that the defendant’s investments in
Sudan aided and abetted that country’s human rights violations).
200 E.g., James Boeving, Half Full . . . or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 133–46 (2005) (Sosa leaves future of
environmental ATS litigation unclear); Maxine Burkett, A Justice Paradox: On Climate Change, Small
Island Developing States, and the Quest for Effective Legal Remedy, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 633, 649–52
(2013) (ATS suits for environmental harm may become viable as international law evolves); Stuart R.
Butzier & Sarah M. Stevenson, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Sacred Sites and Traditional Cultural
Properties and the Role of Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 32 J. ENERGY & NAT.
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Court targeted plaintiffs’ ability to invoke the district courts’ subject-matter
jurisdiction.201 In doing so, however, it transferred these same problematic decisions to
the state court systems.202
¶63
The Supreme Court may have struck a third blow against inventive approaches to
human rights litigation in Daimler AG v. Bauman.203 Where human rights abuses occur
abroad, personal jurisdiction over the defendant usually exists only by way of general
jurisdiction.204 After Bauman, general jurisdiction over a corporation may be exercised
only in its place of incorporation or where it has its principal place of business.205
¶64
While the Court’s concern has been with the potential for an embarrassing
overabundance of human rights litigation in the federal courts,206 the possibility of statecourt foreign-conduct human rights litigation means that the same national
embarrassment can occur as a result of a paucity of such litigation at the federal level. A
ruling about personal jurisdiction affects the cases that the states may hear in a way that
Sosa and Kiobel did not; of the three, Bauman may have the greatest impact on ATS
litigation. Nonetheless, even after Bauman a number of cases may still be heard in state
courts implicating foreign relations to an extent that they ought to be heard in federal
court. Consequently, we should opt for a reading of Kiobel that permits these cases to be
heard in federal court.

V. ADDRESSING KIOBEL’S IMPACT IN LIGHT OF BAUMAN
A. Bauman and Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants
¶65

To a significant extent, the Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman mitigated many of the
problems that might have arisen out of Kiobel. On one hand, if the court may assert
specific jurisdiction over a defendant, in which case the litigation must necessarily arise
out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, the policy considerations that drove
Kiobel seem less urgent. Regarding general jurisdiction, on the other hand, there was a
gulf after Kiobel between the sorts of potentially embarrassing cases that could not be

RESOURCES L. 297, 327–28 (2014) (prior refusal to recognize environmental damage as violation of
customary international law may change); Jaclyn Lopez, The New Normal: Climate Change Victims in
Post- Kiobel United States Federal Courts, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 113, 140–44 (2013) (arguing for an
international norm supporting ATS jurisdiction for climate change plaintiffs).
201 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
202 See supra Part III.
203 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
204 Cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (general
jurisdiction is when a court exercises “personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or
related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum”).
205 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61. The Court noted that place of incorporation and principal place of
business were paradigmatic bases of general jurisdiction, the true test being whether the corporation was at
home in the forum state, and refused to extend general jurisdiction to any place where the defendant
corporation merely had “continuous and systematic” contacts. While this does not mean that the
paradigmatic bases of general jurisdiction are the only bases, the Court did not imply that it thought that
other such bases might exist.
206 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–65, 1668–89; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004).

75

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2014

heard in federal court and those that were barred from state court.207 We would want to
read Kiobel in such a way as to minimize this gulf, but no reading could have eliminated
it altogether. Bauman takes a step toward minimizing the gulf, but as this section argues,
it too does not eliminate it altogether.
¶66
Bauman has its greatest effect regarding foreign corporations when the conduct
giving rise to the litigation did not occur in the United States.208 A corporation must in
some sense be American before it can be sued in an American court over its foreign
conduct.209 The Court did not explicitly say that the only way to establish that a
corporation’s principal place of business was in the United States was to look to where it
had its corporate headquarters, but it did refer to the case that identified “principal place
of business” as “corporate headquarters” in noting the desirability of having clear
jurisdictional rules.210 With increasing multi-nationality and shifts in corporate structure,
however, it is not inconceivable that foreign corporations will continue to be held to have
their principal place of business within the United States.
¶67
Because of state long-arm statutes, moreover, some foreign-conduct human rights
litigation can be conducted under the rubric of specific jurisdiction. States may exercise
personal jurisdiction over those accused of intentional torts if the brunt of the harm was
felt in their borders and that harm was intentionally aimed at the state.211 Some circuits
have permitted suits to proceed when the plaintiff alleges only that the brunt of the harm
was felt within the state.212 Most foreign-conduct human rights abuses will fail this
standard, of course. Nonetheless, human rights abuses committed abroad in order to
distress persons in the United States, such as dissidents in exile or foreign diplomatic
personnel, certainly cause harm felt in and are aimed at the territory of the United
States.213 Further, foreign human rights abuses orchestrated from within the United States
can also give rise to litigation under specific jurisdiction.
¶68
Tightening the rules of personal jurisdiction fails to keep foreign-conduct human
rights litigation out of state court most obviously when the defendant is an individual.
Personal jurisdiction over individuals may be established by nothing more than bare
207

See supra Part III.
Bauman did not address the question of when unincorporated organizations may be subject to general
jurisdiction, in part because Daimler AG did not object to the plaintiffs’ claim that a California court could
exercise general jurisdiction over its subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC. See Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746, 758 (2014). The Court may in the future tighten the rules governing general jurisdiction
over unions, partnerships, limited liability companies, and the like.
209 Id. at 762 (defendant’s “affiliations with the State [must be] so continuous and systematic as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State” (citation omitted)).
210 Id. at 760 (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)).
211 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984).
212 See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’p, 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
213 See Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort
Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 608 (2013) (citing Magnifico v. Villanueva, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D.
Fla. 2011)). Many human rights abuses targeting the United States are covered by the Torture Victim
Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), but that statute permits recovery only by the
person tortured or, in the case of extrajudicial killings, by those who could bring a wrongful death suit.
Moreover, only acts committed under color of state authority are actionable, but states cannot be made
subject to suit. See Alford, supra note 2, at 1755–56. Similarly, those subjected to forced labor or turned
over to human traffickers in order to distress persons living in the United States may recover under the
Trafficking Victim Protection Act, if they can make it to an American court, but the persons in the United
States who were to be distressed by that forced labor may not. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
208
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service of process,214 as a number of foreign ATS defendants have discovered the hard
way.215 With regard to natural persons, personal jurisdiction in principle poses no barrier
to foreign-cubed human rights litigation in the state courts.
¶69
Bauman exiles a great deal of foreign-conduct human rights litigation—and human
rights litigation in general—from both federal and state court, but it does leave openings
for such litigation. The kinds of human rights litigation that can be heard in the United
States after Bauman, however, by and large ought to be heard in the United States, and if
that litigation is to be heard at all it ought to be handled in the federal system. Rather than
trying to see Bauman and Kiobel as a tag team that tosses human rights litigation from the
federal system—a result that would toss a number of cases into the state system rather
than out of the country entirely—we should instead see Bauman as eclipsing Kiobel.
B. Letting Bauman Eclipse Kiobel
¶70

Three points are worth making at this juncture. One, the sort of foreign-conduct
human rights litigation that could satisfy personal jurisdiction after Bauman does not, in
the main, trigger the foreign policy concerns that led the Court in Kiobel to take a
skeptical view of foreign-conduct human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute.
Two, we would want all such litigation that might be heard in the states to have the
potential to be heard in a federal court, and this would mean letting Bauman rather than
Kiobel operate as a gatekeeper regarding foreign-conduct human rights litigation, at least
where corporate defendants are concerned. Three, the “touch and concern” language of
Kiobel can be read expansively enough that permitting Bauman to eclipse Kiobel
regarding foreign corporate defendants does not require revisiting the latter’s holding.
The total eclipse of Kiobel by Bauman is not possible with regard to individual
defendants, however. The most that can be done regarding individual defendants is to
read Kiobel to permit suits where personal jurisdiction could be established on the basis
of the effects test that governs intentional torts or (perhaps) on the basis of domicile,216
but not when personal jurisdiction is established solely by the in-person service of
process.
¶71
Kiobel took aim at a specific kind of case, one in which the U.S. court system
seemed to provide a kind of universal jurisdiction.217 Nigerian police had targeted Ogoni
villages in the early 1990s, supposedly with the help and encouragement of the Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria.218 A decade later, after being granted
asylum in the United States, the plaintiffs filed suit for what had occurred in Nigeria.219
Similarly, in Bauman, Argentine residents brought suit some two decades after the close
of the Dirty War against the German parent corporation of Mercedes-Benz Argentina.220
214

Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980).
216 For the effects test, see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984).
217 Cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013) (“[T]here is no indication that
the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of
international norms.”).
218 Id. at 1662–63.
219 Id.
220 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014).
215
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In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, Israeli plaintiffs looked for relief from an American
court concerning the terrorist activities of Libya and various Palestinian groups in
murdering civilians in Israel.221 Indeed, it was precisely this sort of foreign-cubed
litigation that marked the revitalization of the Alien Tort Statute in the first place.222 This
was a far cry from the adjudication of prizes223 or of property within the military
jurisdiction of the United States224 that were formerly tried under the ATS.
¶72
Most cases where personal jurisdiction is available after Bauman do not raise the
same concerns. A case in point is suits where the defendant is a U.S. citizen or business.
Indeed, providing aliens a way to sue U.S. citizens in U.S. court was the most obvious
point of the ATS, and it would certainly arouse the ire of foreign nations if our citizens
and corporations were not answerable here for their conduct abroad. Conversely, general
jurisdiction would now be unavailable concerning the defendants in Kiobel—a Nigerian
company that was the joint subsidiary of Dutch and English corporations. Only regarding
transient individuals, subject to jurisdiction by in-person service of process, can there be
litigation over things in no way connected to the United States after Bauman. This fact
does not mean, however, that the Kiobel Court’s policy concerns have not been fully
addressed by Bauman. The Kiobel Court does not appear to have been primarily
concerned with defendants like Americo Norberto Pena-Irala or even Radovan Karadzĭć,
served with process while in New York to visit the United Nations but not while on the
Headquarters grounds,225 as opposed to the cottage industry that might arise if corporate
defendants with deep pockets and assets vulnerable to attachment could be sued in U.S.
courts for activities that might be imputed to them or a subsidiary anywhere in the world.
¶73
This is not to say that U.S. corporations, lawful permanent residents, and citizens
should be amenable to suit under the ATS upon bare policy grounds.226 As discussed
above, the First Congress intended that the ATS should provide a remedy in cases where
the defendant’s impunity would otherwise be a stain upon the national honor.227 Thus,
221

Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
223 E.g., Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Moxon v. the Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
224 E.g., O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908).
225 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237, 246–48 (2d Cir. 1995).
226 Contrast Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2014) (characterizing
the dissent’s argument that “the United States would fail to meet the expectations of the international
community were we to allow U.S. citizens to travel to foreign shores and commit violations of the laws of
nations with impunity” as a “humane observation” or articulating “desirable goals of foreign policy”).
227 See supra Part IV. Thomas Lee’s opposition to permitting ATS suits based solely on the nationality of
the defendant stems from his view that the ATS was intended to deal only with torts the commission of
which violated a formal sovereign obligation of protection, not violations of international law that would
impugn the national honor if they went unpunished. See Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort
Statute: The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645,
1668–69 (2014); Lee, supra note 132, at 871–95. Yet if the ATS really was intended as a “national security
statute” rather than a human rights statute, as Lee forcefully argues, then it would seem that the First
Congress would have had a concern for the moral or informal sovereign obligation to hold one’s own
citizens to account for conduct abroad regardless of whether Grotius or Vattel would have blessed a war
made against the United States for shirking that obligation and even regardless of whether the result was
immediate war or diplomatic isolation. Cf. Doug Cassel, supra note 11, at 1778–79 (arguing for a
permission under international law, but not a formal sovereign obligation, to police citizen behavior abroad
in justifying ATS jurisdiction founded solely on nationality). That is, this paper does not argue that the ATS
should be applied beyond the scope intended by the First Congress or that Congress’s intent should be
222
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while the presumption against extraterritoriality might more often focus on the “site of
the conduct” than on the “identity of the defendant,”228 there are strong reasons of
legislative intent why that general rule does not hold regarding the ATS.229 Similarly,
while the Court was clear in Kiobel that a defendant’s “mere corporate presence” in the
United States would not suffice to bring a dispute within the jurisdiction conferred by the
ATS,230 place of incorporation and principal place of business are far more robust ties
than the minimal “continuous and systematic general business contacts” standard that
governed general jurisdiction analysis when Royal Dutch Petroleum was haled into
court.231 The fact the ATS was not intended to assert jurisdiction over any human rights
violation committed anywhere in the world232 does not support a conclusion that the ATS
was actually to have no effect whatsoever on violations whose connection to the United
States lay solely in their perpetrators. After all, it is the norm that you sue a defendant at
its home if you cannot get it to come to yours.
¶74
It would go too far, on the other hand, to insist that a defendant be a U.S. citizen
before suit could be brought under the Alien Tort Statute.233 As argued above, such a
requirement is not needed to conform the statute to the boundaries of the federal judicial
power set by Article III.234 One of the causes célèbres that prompted the First Congress
involved an attack by a Frenchman upon another Frenchman,235 and we would expect that
aliens acting in a manner that touches and concerns the United States could be held
accountable in the U.S. even if they cause less than $75,000 in damages. Similarly, a
requirement grounded in Article III that the defendant have U.S. citizenship would mean
that permanent lawful residents of the United States could never be sued in the courts of
the United States for violations of international law abroad.
¶75
Bauman largely allays the concerns at work behind Kiobel, and it does so in a more
effective way. The “touch and concern” language of the latter is an invitation to litigation,
with plaintiffs asserting a nexus with the territory of the United States and defendants
decrying that nexus’s insufficiency. Courts have since been asked to engage in a fact-

discerned by reference to our own foreign policy considerations. Rather, the differences between the 1789
Alien Tort Statute and the violations of safe conduct condemned by the 1790 Crimes Act suggest that the
former was not concerned solely with safe conducts and thus with violations occurring on American soil,
but rather with the broader problem of cases affecting foreign relations.
228 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 n.24 (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 74–
76 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
229 See supra Part IV.
230 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
231 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (general jurisdiction
requires “continuous and systematic general business contacts”). The Court would not explain that the
threshold for general jurisdiction was an affiliation “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the
defendant] essentially at home in the forum State” until June 27, 2011. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citation omitted). This was ten months after the last
substantive opinion in the suit against Royal Dutch Petroleum before the Supreme Court’s final ruling. See
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). See also Wuerth, supra note 213, at
608–9.
232 See supra Part IV.
233 Contrast with Bellia & Clark, supra note 102, at 525–28; Bradley, supra note 3.
234 See supra Part IV.A.
235 Casto, supra note 8, 490–91.
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sensitive analysis of how much of a nexus is enough of a nexus.236 A lack of personal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is more readily established, in part because the Court
adopted a clear standard for general jurisdiction237 and in part because courts are more
used to dealing with questions of personal jurisdiction. More importantly, a rule
regarding the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts fails to keep the case out of
state court.
¶76
Because Bauman addresses the policy concerns of Kiobel, while Kiobel fails to
address those concerns when it comes to state courts, it makes sense to let the former
eclipse the latter. This article now turns to whether Kiobel’s language permits this. That
is, if personal jurisdiction can be asserted over a defendant after Bauman, is it also the
case that, on a plausible reading of Kiobel, the litigation touches and concerns the
territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality?
¶77
It is unproblematic to see Kiobel as satisfied whenever personal jurisdiction is
obtained by reason of the defendant’s domicile.238 In those cases, there is certainly some
nexus with the territory of the United States. They might be foreign-conduct cases, but
they are not foreign-cubed. The plaintiff may be an alien, the conduct may have occurred
for the most part overseas, but the defendant will either be a U.S. national or a resident
alien. Were state courts to provide foreign plaintiffs with inadequate satisfaction, either
because of the law applied or the fairness of their proceedings, the national honor might
certainly be implicated in ways that drove the ATS in the first place. A similar logic
applies to corporate defendants that have their principal place of business in the United
States. Such suits could in many cases be heard under the federal courts’ diversity
jurisdiction, but the ATS both provides a uniform cause of action subject to federal
control and fills in the gaps of diversity jurisdiction.239
¶78
Leaving aside cases where the defendant is closely associated with the United
States, the broadest application of the ATS that respects Kiobel’s requirement that the
conduct complained of touch and concern the territory of the United States—other than
illegal conduct actually taking place within or orchestrated from the United States—
would be where some harm was targeted at the United States. Terrorist attacks on U.S.
embassies abroad may qualify.240 As discussed above, the torture or enslavement of
family members of aliens in the United States in order to affect their activities, or simply
to cause distress, would also touch and concern U.S. territory.241 Because the ATS was
236

See, e.g., Jovic v. L-3 Services, Inc., No. 10-CV-5197, 2014 WL 4748614, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 24,
2014); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357, 2014 WL 4746256, at *12–14 (D.D.C. Sep. 23, 2014);
Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-CV-5395, 2014 WL 1669873, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014); Du Daobin v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014); Kaplan v. Central Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran,
2013 WL 4427943, at *15–16 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Minister of Interior, Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 2013 WL 3991961, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2013); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Trayers,
2013 WL 3326212, at *2 (D. Conn. Jul. 1, 2013); Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2013 WL
2370594, at *14 (D.D.C. May 31, 2013).
237 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760–62 (2014).
238 See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528–31 (4th Cir. 2014); Du Daobin v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 717 (D. Md. 2014); Ahmed v. Magan, No. 10-CV-00342, 2014 WL 4479077, at
*1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013).
239 For these gaps, see supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
240 See Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
241 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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enacted in order to ensure a federal forum to aliens who could not otherwise avail
themselves of diversity jurisdiction, and because such cases could be heard in state courts
where personal jurisdiction was had over the defendant, such cases are not as foreign to
the original intent of the ATS as other foreign-cubed human rights litigation.242
Moreover, foreign states have less justification to complain that the United States is
regulating conduct within their borders if that conduct intentionally harms persons under
the legal protection of the American government. Insofar as the presumption against
extraterritoriality is founded upon a tacit congressional respect for comity among
sovereigns, that presumption ought to be weaker where that comity is lacking.
¶79
This is not to argue that Bauman can completely eclipse Kiobel, but only that
Kiobel should be read narrowly, its policy objectives having been satisfied by Bauman.
Because individual defendants are still subject to personal jurisdiction by the bare service
of process, even the least restrictive reading of Kiobel does not permit ATS suits
wherever personal jurisdiction is satisfied. That is, a state court might be able to assert
personal jurisdiction over a transient defendant and that defendant may find him-orherself unable to remove to federal court under the ATS on this reading. While
undesirable from a policy standpoint, that result is compelled by Kiobel, even when read
to permit a wide range of foreign-conduct human rights litigation.
¶80
This is also not to say that federal courts would have to hear every case that could
be heard under the Bauman-Kiobel criteria outlined above simply because a plaintiff or
defendant desired it. The same discretionary doctrines of forum non conveniens, comity,
exhaustion, and deference to the executive that courts could invoke in ATS cases before
Kiobel can be invoked afterwards.243

VI. CONCLUSION
¶81

The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the Alien Tort Statute can be understood
as reactions to the threat of international scandals initiated by a district court judge’s
interpretation of customary international law. The Court first attempted to provide
guidance regarding the substantive law to be applied in Sosa, but it further curtailed
lower federal court discretion through a narrowing of their jurisdiction in Kiobel. The
result of this narrowing, however, is to leave foreign-conduct human rights litigation to
the states. Nothing prevents the states from taking such cases. If there is to be an
American forum, however, it is preferable that this forum be federal. Because
congressional action would most likely be necessary in order to take such cases away
from the states, and because Congress enacted the ATS out of federalism concerns, we
ought to interpret Kiobel in such a way that permits greater access to the federal courts.
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See supra Part IV.
Cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment) (suggesting that these doctrines be employed to reduce international friction); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., Nos. 01-CV-1357 & 07-CV-1022, 2014 WL 4746256, at *6–8 (D.D.C. Sep. 23, 2014)
(applying these doctrines in context of ATS suit).
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